The Romans never allowed a trouble spot to remain simply to avoid going to war over it, because they knew that wars don't just go away, they are only postponed to someone else's advantage. Therefore, they made war with Philip and Antiochus in Greece, in order not to have to fight them in Italy... They never went by that saying which you constantly hear from the wiseacres of our day, that time heals all things. They trusted rather their own character and prudence— knowing perfectly well that time contains the seeds of all things, good as well as bad.
Ch. 3 (as translated by RM Adams) Variants [these can seem to generalize the circumstances in ways that the translation above does not.]: The Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only put off to the advantage of others.
There is no avoiding war; it can only be postponed to the advantage of others.
If someone puts up the argument that King Louis gave the Romagna to Pope Alexander, and the kingdom of Naples to Spain, in order to avoid a war, I would answer as I did before: that you should never let things get out of hand in order to avoid war. You don't avoid such a war, you merely postpone it, to your own disadvantage.
Ch. 3 (as translated by RM Adams)
A prudent man should always follow in the path trodden by great men and imitate those who are most excellent.
Ch. 6
It ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct,
or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.
Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm
defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents,
who have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe
in new things until they have had a long experience of them.
Ch. 6
Hence it comes that all armed prophets have been victorious, and all unarmed prophets have been destroyed.
Ch. 6
The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and good arms; and
as there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well
armed they have good laws.
Ch. 12
A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and
its rules and discipline; for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such
force that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men to rise from a private
station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than
of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of your losing it is to neglect this art; and
what enables you to acquire a state is to be master of the art.
Ch. 14; Variant: A prince should therefore have no other aim or thought, nor take up any other thing for his study but war and it organization and discipline, for that is the only art that is necessary to one who commands.
Among other evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to be despised.
Ch 14
Many have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to exist in reality;
for how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what
ought to be done, will rather bring about his own ruin than his preservation.
Ch. 15
I say that every prince must desire to be considered merciful and not cruel. He must, however, take
care not to misuse this mercifulness. … A prince, therefore, must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty
for the purpose of keeping his subjects united and confident; for, with a very few examples, he will
be more merciful than those who, from excess of tenderness, allow disorders to arise, from whence spring
murders and rapine; for these as a rule injure the whole community, while the executions carried out
by the prince injure only one individual. And of all princes, it is impossible for a new prince to escape
the name of cruel, new states being always full of dangers. … Nevertheless, he must be cautious in believing
and acting, and must not inspire fear of his own accord, and must proceed in a temperate manner with
prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence does not render him incautious, and too much diffidence
does not render him intolerant. From this arises the question whether it is better to be loved more
than feared, or feared more than loved. The reply is, that one ought to be both feared and loved, but
as it is difficult for the two to go together, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one of the
two has to be wanting. For it may be said of men in general that they are ungrateful, voluble, dissemblers,
anxious to avoid danger, and covetous of gain ; as long as you benefit them, they are entirely yours;
they offer you their blood, their goods, their life, and their children, as I have before said, when
the necessity is remote; but when it approaches, they revolt. And the prince who has relied solely on
their words, without making other preparations, is ruined, for the friendship which is gained by purchase
and not through grandeur and nobility of spirit is merited but is not secured, and at times is not to
be had. And men have less scruple in offending one who makes himself loved than one who makes himself
feared; for love is held by a chain of obligation which, men being selfish, is broken whenever it serves
their purpose; but fear is maintained by a dread of punishment which never fails.
Ch. 17, as translated by Luigi Ricci (1903)
Variant translations of portions of this passage:
From this arises the question whether it is better to be loved rather than feared, or feared rather
than loved. It might perhaps be answered that we should wish to be both: but since love and fear can
hardly exist together, if we must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved.
He ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate
manner with prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and too much
distrust render him intolerable.
The prince who relies upon their words, without having otherwise provided for his security, is ruined; for friendships that are won by awards, and not by greatness and nobility of soul, although deserved, yet are not real, and cannot be depended upon in time of adversity.
Still, a prince should make himself feared in such a way that if he does not gain love, he at any rate avoids hatred; for fear and the absence of hatred may well go together, and will be always attained by one who abstains from interfering with the property of his citizens and subjects or with their women. And when he is obliged to take the life of any one, to do so when there is a proper justification and manifest reason for it; but above all he must abstain from taking the property of others, for men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony. Then also pretexts for seizing property are never wanting, and one who begins to live by rapine will always find some reason for taking the goods of others, whereas causes for taking life are rarer and more quickly destroyed.
Ch. 17
How laudable it is for a prince to keep good faith and live with integrity, and not with astuteness,
every one knows. Still the experience of our times shows those princes to have done great things who
have had little regard for good faith, and have been able by astuteness to confuse men's brains, and
who have ultimately overcome those who have made loyalty their foundation. You must know, then, that
there are two methods of fighting, the one by law, the other by force: the first method is that of men,
the second of beasts; but as the first method is often insufficient, one must have recourse to the second.
It is therefore necessary to know well how to use both the beast and the man. This was covertly taught
to princes by ancient writers, who relate how Achilles and many others of those princes were given to
Chiron the centaur to be brought up, who kept them under his discipline; this system of having for teacher
one who was half beast and half man is meant to indicate that a prince must know how to use both natures,
and that the one without the other is not durable. A prince being thus obliged to know well how to act
as a beast must imitate the fox and the lion, for the lion cannot protect himself from snares, and the
fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One must therefore be a fox to recognise snares, and a lion to
frighten wolves. Those that wish to be only lions do not understand this. Therefore, a prudent ruler
ought not to keep faith when by so doing it would be against his interest, and when the reasons which
made him bind himself no longer exist. If men were all good, this precept would not be a good one; but
as they are bad, and would not observe their faith with you, so you are not bound to keep faith with
them.
Ch. 18
Variant translations of portions of this passage:
Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to live with integrity and not
with craft. Nevertheless our experience has been that those princes who have done great things have
held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and
in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word.
Ch. 18. Concerning the Way in which Princes should keep Faith (as translated by W. K. Marriott)
A prince being thus obliged to know well how to act as a beast must imitate the fox and the lion, for
the lion cannot protect himself from traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One must
therefore be a fox to recognize traps, and a lion to frighten wolves.
You must know there are two ways of contesting, the one by the law, the other by force; the first method
is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary
to have recourse to the second.
A prince never lacks legitimate reasons to break his promise.
Ch. 18
Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves
to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them.
Ch. 18
The prince must consider, as has been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make
him hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will have fulfilled his part,
and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches. It makes him hated above all things, as I have
said, to be rapacious, and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from both of
which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor honour is touched, the majority of men live
content, and he has only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways.
It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute,
from all of which a prince should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in his
actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his private dealings with his subjects let
him show that his judgments are irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can
hope either to deceive him or to get round him. That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression
of himself, and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, provided it is well
known that he is an excellent man and revered by his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty.
Ch. 19 "That one should avoid being despised and hated"
A prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other from without,
on account of external powers. From the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies,
and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will always remain quiet within when
they are quiet without, unless they should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should
affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as
long as he does not despair, he will resist every attack.
Ch. 19; Variant: Against foreign powers, a prince can defend himself with good weapons and good friends;
if he has good weapons, he will never lack for good friends. (as translated by RM Adams)
The best fortress which a prince can possess is the affection of his people.
Ch.20 "Are fortresses, and many other things to which princes often resort advantageous or hurtful"
The first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is by observing the men he
has around him; and when they are capable and faithful he may always be considered wise, because he
has known how to recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are otherwise one cannot
form a good opinion of him, for the prime error which he made was in choosing them. (as tranlsated by
W. K. Marriott)
Ch. 22. Variant translation: The first method for estimating the intelligence of a ruler is to look
at the men he has around him.
There are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; another which appreciates what
others comprehend; and a third which neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the
first is the most excellent, the second is good, and the third is useless.
Ch. 22
There is no other way of guarding oneself against flattery than by letting men understand that they
will not offend you by speaking the truth; but when everyone can tell you the truth, you lose their
respect.
Ch. 23
Io iudico bene questo, che sia meglio essere impetuoso che respettivo; perché la fortuna è donna, et
è necessario, volendola tenere sotto, batterla et urtarla. E si vede che la si lascia più vincere da
questi, che da quelli che freddamente procedano. E però sempre, come donna, è amica de' giovani, perché
sono meno respettivi, più feroci e con più audacia la comandano.
Translation: I conclude, then, that so long as Fortune varies and men stand still, they will prosper
while they suit the times, and fail when they do not. But I do feel this: that it is better to be rash
than timid, for Fortune is a woman, and the man who wants to hold her down must beat and bully her.
We see that she yields more often to men of this stripe than to those who come coldly toward her.
Ch. 25 (as translated by RM Adams)
Where the willingness is great, the difficulties cannot be great.
Ch. 26
God is not willing to do everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory which
belongs to us.
Ch. 26
ognuno vede quello che tu pari, pochi sentono quello che tu se; e quelli pochi non ardiseano opporsi
alla opinione di molti che abbino la maestà dello stato ch li difenda:...
Translation: Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare
not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them
Variant trans: Everybody sees what you seem, but few know what thou art
Ch. 28
Discourses on Livy (1517)[edit]
Whenever men are not obliged to fight from necessity, they fight from ambition; which is so powerful
in human breasts, that it never leaves them no matter to what rank they rise.
Anyone who studies present and ancient affairs will easily see how in all cities and all peoples there
still exist, and have always existed, the same desires and passions.
Quotes from translations of Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio; 3 vols. published between 1512–1517
(Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius)
As all those have shown who have discussed civil institutions, and as every history is full of examples,
it is necessary to whoever arranges to found a Republic and establish laws in it, to presuppose that
all men are bad and that they will use their malignity of mind every time they have the opportunity;
and if such malignity is hidden for a time, it proceeds from the unknown reason that would not be known
because the experience of the contrary had not been seen, but time, which is said to be the father of
every truth, will cause it to be discovered.
Book 1, Ch. 3 Variant portion: Whoever desires to found a state and give it laws, must start with assuming
that all men are bad and ever ready to display their vicious nature, whenever they may find occasion
for it.
Men never do good unless necessity drives them to it; but when they are free to choose and can do just
as they please, confusion and disorder become rampant.
Book 1, Ch. 3 (as translated by L.J. Walker & B. Crick)
The demands of a free populace, too, are very seldom harmful to liberty, for they are due either to
the populace being oppressed or to the suspicious that it is going to be oppressed... and, should these
impressions be false, a remedy is provided in the public platform on which some man of standing can
get up, appeal to the crowd, and show that it is mistaken. And though, as Tully remarks, the populace
may be ignorant, it is capable of grasping the truth and readily yields when a man, worthy of confidence,
lays the truth before it.
Book 1, Ch. 4 (as translated by LJ Walker & B Crick)
So in all human affairs one notices, if one examines them closely, that it is impossible to remove one
inconvenience without another emerging.
Book 1, Ch. 6 (as translated by LJ Walker & B Crick)
I am firmly convinced, therefore, that to set up a republic which is to last a long time, the way to
set about it is to constitute it as Sparta and Venice were constituted; to place it in a strong position,
and so to fortify it that no one will dream of taking it by a sudden assault; and, on the other hand,
not to make it so large as to appear formidable to its neighbors. It should in this way be able to enjoy
its form of government for a long time. For war is made on a commonwealth for two reasons: to subjugate
it, and for fear of being subjugated by it.
Book 1, Ch. 6 (as translated by LJ Walker & B Crick)
The people resemble a wild beast, which, naturally fierce and accustomed to live in the woods, has been
brought up, as it were, in a prison and in servitude, and having by accident got its liberty, not being
accustomed to search for its food, and not knowing where to conceal itself, easily becomes the prey
of the first who seeks to incarcerate it again.
Book 1, Ch. 16
It was the verdict of ancient writers that men afflict themselves in evil and weary themselves in the
good, and that the same effects result from both of these passions. For whenever men are not obliged
to fight from necessity, they fight from ambition; which is so powerful in human breasts, that it never
leaves them no matter to what rank they rise. The reason is that nature has so created men that they
are able to desire everything but are not able to attain everything: so that the desire being always
greater than the acquisition, there results discontent with the possession and little satisfaction to
themselves from it. From this arises the changes in their fortunes; for as men desire, some to have
more, some in fear of losing their acquisition, there ensues enmity and war, from which results the
ruin of that province and the elevation of another.
Book 1, Ch. 37 Variant: Nature has so contrived that to men, though all things are objects of desire,
not all things are attainable; so that desire always exceeds the power of attainment, with the result
that men are ill-content with what they possess and their present state brings them little satisfaction.
Hence arise the vicissitudes of their fortune. (as translated by LJ Walker & B Crick)
Anyone who studies present and ancient affairs will easily see how in all cities and all peoples there
still exist, and have always existed, the same desires and passions. Thus, it is an easy matter for
him who carefully examines past events to foresee future events in a republic and to apply the remedies
employed by the ancients, or, if old remedies cannot be found, to devise new ones based upon the similarity
of the events. But since these matters are neglected or not understood by those who read, or, if understood,
remain unknown to those who govern, the result is that the same problems always exist in every era.
Book 1, Chapter 39
It is enough to ask somebody for his weapons without saying 'I want to kill you with them', because
when you have his weapons in hand, you can satisfy your desire.
Book 1, Ch 44 (as translated by Julia Conaway Bondanella and Peter Bondanella)
When Scipio became consul and was keen on getting the province of Africa, promising that Carthage should
be completely destroyed, and the senate would not agree to this because Fabius Maximus was against it,
he threatened to appeal to the people, for he knew full well how pleasing such projects are to the populace.
Book 1, Ch. 53 (as translated by LJ Walker & B Crick)
It is truly a marvelous thing to consider to what greatness Athens arrived in the space of one hundred
years after she freed herself from the tyranny of Pisistratus; but, above all, it is even more marvelous
to consider the greatness Rome reached when she freed herself from her kings. The reason is easy to
understand, for it is the common good and not private gain that makes cities great. Yet, without a doubt,
this common good is observed only in republics, for in them everything that promotes it is practised,
and however much damage it does to this or that private individual, those who benefit from the said
common good are so numerous that they are able to advance in spite of the inclination of the few citizens
who are oppressed by it.
Book 2, Chapter 2
The end of the republic is to enervate and to weaken all other bodies so as to increase its own body.
Book 2, Ch. 3 (translation by Mansfield and Tarcov)
Cunning and deceit will every time serve a man better than force to rise from a base condition to great
fortune.
Book 2, Ch. 13
I assert once again as a truth to which history as a whole bears witness that men may second their fortune,
but cannot oppose it; that they may weave its warp, but cannot break it. Yet they should never give
up, because there is always hope, though they know not the end and more towards it along roads which
cross one another and as yet are unexplored; and since there is hope, they should not despair, no matter
what fortune brings or in what travail they find themselves.
Book 2, Ch. 29 (as translated by LJ Walker & B Crick)
This return of Republics back to their principles also results from the simple virtue of one man, without
depending on any law that excites him to any execution: none the less, they are of such influence and
example that good men desire to imitate him, and the wicked are ashamed to lead a life contrary to those
examples.
Book 3, Ch. 1
It is not titles that make men illustrious, but men who make titles illustrious.
Book 3, Ch. 38
The Art of War (1520)[edit]
Quotations from translations of Dell'arte della guerra ; also known as On the Art of War
I believe that it is possible for one to praise, without concern, any man after he is dead since every
reason and supervision for adulation is lacking.
Book 1
No proceeding is better than that which you have concealed from the enemy until the time you have executed
it. To know how to recognize an opportunity in war, and take it, benefits you more than anything else.
Nature creates few men brave, industry and training makes many. Discipline in war counts more than fury.
Book 7; Variant translation: No enterprise is more likely to succeed than one concealed from the enemy
until it is ripe for execution.
Nothing is of greater importance in time of war than in knowing how to make the best use of a fair opportunity
when it is offered.
Few men are brave by nature, but good discipline and experience make many so.
Good order and discipline in an army are more to be depended upon than ferocity.
As translated by Neal Wood (1965)
The History of Florence (1521 - 1525)[edit]
Original Italian title: Istorie Fiorentine
It may be observed, that provinces amid the vicissitudes to which they are subject, pass from order
into confusion, and afterward recur to a state of order again; for the nature of mundane affairs not
allowing them to continue in an even course, when they have arrived at their greatest perfection, they
soon begin to decline. In the same manner, having been reduced by disorder, and sunk to their utmost
state of depression, unable to descend lower, they, of necessity, reascend; and thus from good they
gradually decline to evil, and from evil again return to good. The reason is, that valor produces peace;
peace, repose; repose, disorder; disorder, ruin; so from disorder order springs; from order virtue,
and from this, glory and good fortune.
Book V, Chapter 1
If you only notice human proceedings, you may observe that all who attain great power and riches, make
use of either force or fraud; and what they have acquired either by deceit or violence, in order to
conceal the disgraceful methods of attainment, they endeavor to sanctify with the false title of honest
gains. Those who either from imprudence or want of sagacity avoid doing so, are always overwhelmed with
servitude and poverty; for faithful servants are always servants, and honest men are always poor; nor
do any ever escape from servitude but the bold and faithless, or from poverty, but the rapacious and
fraudulent. God and nature have thrown all human fortunes into the midst of mankind; and they are thus
attainable rather by rapine than by industry, by wicked actions rather than by good. Hence it is that
men feed upon each other, and those who cannot defend themselves must be worried.
Book III, Chapter 13
Wars begin when you will, but they do not end when you please.
Book III, Chapter 2
War is just when it is necessary; arms are permissible when there is no hope except in arms.
This is a quotation of Titus Livius IX:1 iustum enim est bellum quibus necessarium, et pia arma ubi
nulla in armis spes est) that Machiavelli uses in Ch.24 of Discourses on Livy; Machiavelli similarly
writes that "The justice of the cause is conspicuous; for that war is just which is necessary, and those
arms are sacred from which we derive our only hope." (The Prince, Ch.26)
I am not interested in preserving the status quo; I want to overthrow it. This is a quote by Newt Gingrich, first appearing in an article in the Los Angeles Times in 1991. [1]
Keep your friends close, and your enemies closer. This has sometimes been attributed to Machiavelli, but more often to Sun Tzu, though there are no published sources yet found which predate its use by "Michael Corleone" in The Godfather Part II (1974), written by Mario Puzo & Francis Ford Coppola: My father taught me many things here — he taught me in this room. He taught me — keep your friends close but your enemies closer. Quotes about Machiavelli[edit]
We are much beholden to Machiavelli and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought to do. For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent; his baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility and lubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest; that is, all forms and natures of evil. For without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay, an honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim them, without the help of the knowledge of evil. Francis Bacon
Machiavelli is the complete contrary of a machiavellian, since he describes the tricks of power and “gives the whole show away.” The seducer and the politician, who live in the dialectic and have a feeling and instinct for it, try their best to keep it hidden. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, In Praise of Philosophy (Chicago: 1963), p. 59
Call me a dreamer, but one day, my name will become an adjective for everything cynical and untrustworthy
in human nature.
This is a quote farcically attributed to Machiavelli in America: The Book by Jon Stewart and other people
associated with The Daily Show on Comedy Central; it is not a serious attribution.
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